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Nelson Goodman
American philosopher (1906–1998) — moved the induction problem from “is it justified?” to “which inductions are justified?”
In Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (1955), Goodman posed the grue problem: the same body of observations can support mutually contradictory inductive conclusions — differing only in which predicate is used. “Green” is projectible, “grue” is not. This “New Riddle of Induction” shows Hume never explained why we project some predicates and not others.
The Logic of the Grue Problem
Definition of GrueSomething is grue iff: it is examined before 2100 and is green, or is examined after 2100 and is blue
Observation: all examined emeralds are green
Induction A: all emeralds are green ✓
Induction B: all emeralds are grue (turn blue after 2100) — equally valid!
Main Works and Responses Fact, Fiction and Forecast (1955) Introduced the grue problem — the core paradox of inductive logic Entrenchment Reply Projectibility comes from the history of linguistic practice, not objective structure of the world — “green” became entrenched through frequent use Ways of Worldmaking (1978) Constructivist worldview — the world is a plurality of versions constructed by our symbol systems AI Connection An LLM’s projection patterns are determined by the language distribution of its training data, not external reality — Goodman’s entrenchment theory explains this
→ Grue Problem · Induction Problem · David HumeGoodman (1955)
Nelson Goodman
基本信息
- 全名: Henry Nelson Goodman
- 生卒: 1906-1998
- 国籍: 美国
- 身份: 哲学家
- 核心贡献: 新归纳之谜（grue 问题）、构造主义世界观、符号理论
主要著作
- 《事实、虚构与预测》（Fact, Fiction and Forecast, 1955）——提出 grue 问题
- 《世界的构成方式》（Ways of Worldmaking, 1978）
- 《艺术的语言》（Languages of Art, 1968）
对归纳问题的贡献
Goodman 将归纳问题从”归纳推理是否合理”推向”哪些归纳推理合理”。他的 grue 问题表明：
- 同一组观察数据可支持互相矛盾的归纳结论
- 区别在于描述数据的谓词——“绿色”是可投射的，“grue”不是
- 休谟从未解释为什么我们投射某些谓词而非其他
Goodman 的解答——“习惯化”（entrenchment）——将可投射性归于语言实践的历史，而非世界的客观结构。
与本 wiki 的关联
References
- Goodman, Nelson, 1955, Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “The Problem of Induction”, Section 4.2, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/